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ABSTRACT  
 
There is limited systematic knowledge available about the dynamics of rework in 
highway projects, despite the fact that they frequently exceed budget and schedule by 
more than 10%. A case study of a Spanish highway project, which experienced a 
significant cost overrun as a result of rework, is examined and the causal factors that 
contributed to its occurrence are determined.  Through observation and subsequent 
analysis of interviews and documentation a high degree of interdependency existed 
between perceived causes of rework. This resulted in the nomenclature of Project, 
Organization and People to be adopted and used to develop the rework generic systemic 
model. Scope changes, high complexity, poor skill levels and unexpected underground 
services were found to be the most significant causes of rework. The developed model 
provides managers with insights about the interdependencies and behaviour between 
key influencing variables in highway projects and can be used to stimulate learning and 
process improvements in future highway projects. 
 
Author keywords:  
highway projects, rework, system dynamics. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The highway transport sector in Spain represents 2.62% of the Gross Domestic Product 
and employs 3.05% of the working population, making it one of the most important in 
Europe (Montes 2007). Although the public spending in Spain decreased 37.9% from 
2009 to 2010, highways are the most important sector and represent 37.4% of the total 
public investment (Ministerio de Fomento 2011). Considering the importance of 
highway projects in Spain it is imperative that they are delivered on time and to budget. 
 
Cost overruns in transportation infrastructure projects, such as highways have been 
identified as being attributable to errors and the subsequent rework that often occurs 
(Barber et al., 2000; Love et al. 2012a).  The determination of rework costs in highway 
projects has been limited to date (e.g., Barber et al. 2000; Love et al. 2012a).  However, 
having to unnecessarily redo work that was incorrectly undertaken the first time is a 
pervasive problem in construction and engineering projects (Rogge et al. 2001; Love 
2002; Dissanayake et al. 2003; Love and Edwards 2004; Fayeket al. 2004; 
Palaneeswaran et al. 2008; Hwang et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2012). 
 
Rework often arises from design changes, errors, and omissions that often stem from 
scope uncertainty and the contracting strategy adopted (Burati et al. 1992; Love et al. 
2011).The inherent degree of uncertainty that prevails within transportation 
infrastructure projects can result in their planning being a problematic issue, especially 
when information is not readily available. As a result this can affect decision-makers 
choices during the formative stages of a project (Alessandri et al. 2004).  In the absence 
of available knowledge, decisions that are undertaken prior to, or during construction 
may be erroneous and may even lead to disastrous consequences arising (Love et al. 
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2012b).  When uncertainty is high, initial drawings and specifications will invariably 
change, and the project team will have to solve problems as they arise during 
construction.  Once changes arise they may be deemed to be ambiguous and as a result 
lead to disagreements between parties (Williamson 1979). 
 
Faced with underestimation of costs during the bidding process, the project team tends 
to rely on scope changes or missing units in the budget to recover benefits.  Once 
changes arise they may be deemed to be ambiguous, erroneous and invariably require 
rework.   Rework, on average, contributes to 52% of a total cost overrun incurred and 
can increase schedule overrun by 22% (Love 2002).  Rework costs have been found to 
range from 5% to 20% of contract value in construction and engineering projects with 
design scope changes rework accounting for as much as 50% of the rework that occurs 
(e.g., Barber et al. 2000; Love and Edwards 2004).  Yet, limited knowledge exists about 
rework costs in highway projects, even though such costs can have a negative impact on 
project performance and organizations profitability. 
 
With this in mind, the causal nature of rework that arose in eight highway projects is 
examined.  The findings are used to develop an influence diagram, based on the concept 
of system dynamics, to determine the inter-relationships between variables that 
contributed to rework as well as time and cost overruns experienced.  The developed 
model will enhance understanding about the dynamics of rework and therefore stimulate 
learning and process improvement. A detailed review of rework costs and causes in 
construction and engineering projects can be found in Hwang et al. (2009) and Zhang et 
al. (2012). 
 
 
1. RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
System dynamics is an appropriate modelling technique for analysing or managing 
complex processes, which involve changes over time and are dependent on the 
feedback, transmission, and receipt of information (Love et al. 2008).  System dynamics 
is defined as “a rigorous method for qualitative description, exploration, and analysis of 
complex systems in terms of their processes, information, organizational boundaries, 
and strategies; which facilitates quantitative simulation modelling and analysis for the 
design of system structure and behaviour” (Wolstenhome 1990). System dynamics also 
“offers a rigorous method for the description, exploration, and analysis of complex 
project systems comprised of organizational elements, the project work packages and 
environmental influences” (Rodrigues and Bowers 1996). The method has been used as 
a project post-mortem diagnosis tool (Cooper 1980, Williams et al. 1995). 
Consequently, and in this specific context, it can be used to provide managers with the 
necessary insights about the interdependencies and behaviour between key variables 
that can contribute to rework so that learning and process improvements can be made to 
future projects (Cooper 1993; Love et al. 2008).  The technique of influence 
diagramming, an embedded function of system dynamics, is used in this paper to 
provide the platform for linking the major causal variables of rework in a major 
highway construction project.  
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1.2 CASE STUDY  
 
A case study approach based upon analytic induction is used to examine the underlying 
dynamics that may contribute to rework in highway projects. A case study is 
exploratory in nature, based on interviews and relies heavily on verbal reports and 
unobtrusive observation as data sources. This methodology should be used to 
investigate the technical aspects of a contemporary phenomenon within a real life 
context (Yin 1984), particularly in critical and unique circumstances (Flyvbjerg 2006).  
It is particularly useful when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
difficult to ascertain and when multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 1984). A case 
study can provide analytical rather than pure statistical generalizations and can capture 
the complexity and dynamism of organizational settings in projects (Flyvbjerg 2006). 
 
Analytic induction refers to a systematic examination of similarities between various 
social phenomena to develop generic concepts or ideas. It facilitates modification of 
social concepts and their relationships throughout the research process, with the goal of 
most accurately representing the reality of the situation (Ragin 1994).  No analysis, 
however, can be considered final as reality is inexhaustible and dynamic (Znaniecki 
1934). The determination of causal events that lead to rework can explain the 
interaction that can exist between variables. The conjunction of events can result in 
orthodoxies being established and through the process of observation, generalizations 
can be made. If such generalisations can be repeatedly tested and confirmed, they can 
lead to the discovery of a lawful relationship. 
 
 
1.3 DATA COLLECTION 
 
The researchers acted as non-participant observers throughout the duration of the data 
collection process on-site.  Data was collected from the date on which construction 
commenced onsite to the date of practical completion.  The case study was chosen due 
to its complexity and unique approach used to award contracts.  The entire project was 
designed and documented by the same engineering consulting firm, and was then 
divided into a series of individual projects, which were awarded to different contractors.  
This was the first time in Spain that public infrastructure works implemented different 
contractors and contractual arrangements within one project. 
 
The project comprised of eight sub-projects which was visited between one and three 
times a week throughout their duration.  Each visit lasted between one and three hours. 
The time allocated for organising rework data varied because during the early stages of 
the project the contractor identified and reported few incidents. Block visits of four days 
were also conducted in each project to coincide with increased periods of site activity. 
The researchers acted as observers and at times, relied on their industry experience to 
identify rework events that occurred while reading through the contract documentation 
(i.e., site instructions, change order requests, requests for information, drawing changes, 
etc.),which was stored in the main site offices. However, before any event was 
categorized as rework, its validation was sought from the contractor’s project manager, 
site foreman, and contract’s administrator. Every attempt was made not to disrupt the 
workflow of the site management team and subcontractors. 
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The research relied on reports of individuals’ historical events that are open to biases to 
do with recall and self-presentation. Independent verification of the inferences made 
from interviewees was made. Multiple sources were used to triangulate these data so as 
to obtain a balanced view of the problem at hand. Triangulation was used to cross check 
for internal consistency and reliability, and to test the degree of external validity of the 
data. Documentation provided by the contractor and unstructured interviews with 
project team members (e.g., architect, structural/mechanical/electrical engineers, site 
management team, and subcontractors) were the primary sources of information for 
determining the causes and the costs of rework that were experienced. A total of 45 
interviews with the client’s representative/project manager, design consultants, the 
contractor, subcontractors, and end-users, which ranged from 20 to 90 min in duration, 
were undertaken during the project’s construction phase. Once a rework event was 
identified, then all parties involved with identification and rectification were 
interviewed so a balanced view of the event could be established. Data derived from the 
interviews were transcribed and then given to the interviewee to check for any 
discrepancies that may have arisen.  
 
 
1.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The text derived from the documents and interviews was analysed using the QSR 
NVivo 9 software.  This software is used to organize and analyse unstructured 
information with powerful processes of indexing and theorising.  Fundamentally QSR 
NVivo 9 enables the presence of certain words or concepts within texts or sets of texts 
to be determined. This can enable the researcher to quantify and analyse the presence, 
meanings and relationships of words and concepts, then make inferences about the 
messages contained within the texts.  QSR NVivo 9 also enabled additional data 
sources and journal notes to be incorporated into the analysis as well as identify new 
emergent themes.  The development and re-assessment of themes as analysis progresses 
accords with the calls for avoiding confining data to pre-determined sets of categories 
(Silverman 2001).  Kvale (1996) suggests that ad hoc methods for generating meaning 
enable the researcher to access “a variety of common-sense approaches to interview 
text using an interplay of techniques such as noting patterns, seeing plausibility, making 
comparisons etc.” (p.204). Using QSR NVivo 9 facilitated an organic approach to 
coding as it enabled triggers or categories of textural interest to be coded and used to 
monitor emerging and developing ideas (Kvale 1996). These coding can be modified, 
integrated or migrated as the analysis progresses and the generation of reports, using 
Boolean search, facilitates the recognition of conflicts and contradictions.  
 
Coding, if done well, “is the way you monitor occurrences of data about your ideas and 
the way you test them.  It makes resilient links between data and ideas, links that you 
can trace back to find where particular ideas came from and what data are coded there, 
to justify and account for the interpretation of the ideas” (Morse and Richards 2002). 
Coding was undertaken systematically to ensure the data was treated equally.  The 
initial step in the analysis was to read the interview transcripts.  The transcription 
process itself was used for initial analysis, with the researcher recording notes while 
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transcribing. These initial notes were used to formulate categories, and connect themes, 
and help to begin to think about contextual relationships between them.   
 
The analysis commenced by examining themes associated with ‘change’, ‘error’, ‘cost’ 
and ‘mistakes’.  Using an inbuilt function within QSR NVivo 9, words with similar 
meanings such as mistake and error were identified.  The automated function of word 
frequency query was used to determine the most used words in selected materials 
(‘sources’).  A researcher can manoeuvre from one data source to the next using 
features called ‘doc links, ‘node links’ and ‘data links’.  The researcher creates ‘nodes’ 
to mark relevant concepts and topics in text documents that can be searched and 
analysed. These codings were modified, integrated or migrated as the analysis 
progresses and the generation of reports, using Boolean search, facilitated the 
recognition of conflicts and contradictions.   
From NVivo analysis a high degree of interdependency was perceived between rework 
sources. This resulted in the nomenclature of Project, Organization and People to be 
adopted like in a previous study from Love et al. (2012a). Organization group includes: 
Scope definition; Inappropriate design; No information about the site; Wrong material 
selection; Pressure to start execution; Pressure to finalize works; Commencement of 
construction before design completed; Inadequate interface management between 
contractors and consultants; Discrepancies between the administration and the 
management team; Poor supervision; Lack of adherence of quality control and Lack of 
construction knowledge. Management group includes: Lack of communication; Lack of 
design audits; Lack of knowledge management; Inadequate skills and knowledge; Lack 
of planning and resources; Inadequate coordination with other projects; Lack of staff 
supervision; Ineffective implementation of QA; and Inadequate training. And finally 
People group includes: Stress; Slips; Lack of experience and expertise; Omission of 
checks; and Wrong distribution of information and Misinterpretation due to lack of 
knowledge. 
 
 
1.5 CASE BACKGROUND 
 
The project had a contract value of 48,989,409.44 € and involved a 115 km lane 
extension to the AutoPista (AP) 7 highway from the Mediterranean junction AP-2, to 
Vilaseca/Salou. It was a concession contract for ACESA (Autopistas Concesionaria 
Española S.A.) to develop this works to improve the public service of the highway. 
ACESA was the responsible to submit the project to competition. In addition, several 
underpasses and bridges were required and as a result the project was divided into eight 
sub-projects (Table 1 and Figure 1). Each subproject was competitively awarded under 
a separate works contract.  
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Project 
ID 
Sub-project Type Ocv€ Acv€ 
Rework as 
% of Ocv 
Cost 
increase 
(%) 
Schedule 
increase 
(%) 
1 Extension of the structure from 
211+329 kilometric point (KP) 
to 227+000 KP 
1,193,293 1,795,619 Unknown 50.5 
- 
2 Extension of the structure from 
227+000 KP to 256+288 KP 
1,322,944 2,118,960 Unknown 60.2 
- 
3 Masonry extension 420.5 KP 3,766,431 4,900,202 14.0 30.1 - 
4 Masonry Remodelling 210.8 KP 376,136 427,462 8.3 13.6 - 
5 Extension of the platform from 
210+478 KP to 234+001 KP 
16,770,836 32,260,203 31.2 92.4 3 months 
6 Extension of the platform from 
234+001KP to 256+KP 
14,926,805 21,704,742 13.0 45.4 4 months 
7 Paving surface and horizontal 
signalling from 210+478 KP to 
256+288 KP 
8,504,534 10,235,866 17.0 20.4 2 days 
8 Adaptation of the vehicles 
containment system 
2,128,427 3,060,635 16.0 43.8 2 months 
 
Table 1 .Projects’ details 
 
 
 
 
 
Project 1 
 
Project 2 
 
Project 3 
 
Project 4 
 
Project 5 Project 6 
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Project 7 
 
Project 8 
 
Figure 1. AutoPista (AP) 7 highway. 
 
 
 
2. REWORK CAUSATION 
 
The selected projects experienced significant cost overruns due to changes, errors, 
omissions, which resulted in the occurrence of rework. Despite the presence of rework it 
was not formally measured, as there was a perception that such recognition could 
potentially damage the organization’s corporate image.  While additional costs could be 
identified and attributable to an event, for example, an error on a drawing, rework was 
an uncomfortable term for the contractor as it had a negative connation.  However, the 
contractor was curious to know ‘why’ and ‘how’ rework arose in their project. Through 
observation and subsequent analyse of interviews and documentation a taxonomy of 
rework causes based upon Project, Organization and People (POP) is presented in Table 
2.  Love et al. (2012a) have undertaken similar research and revealed that rework could 
also be classified accordingly.  The taxonomy has enabled the common factors 
contributing to rework in the sub-projects to be identified. In deriving the POP 
taxonomy each sub-project is examined herein after. 
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Project  
Scope definition         
Inappropriate design         
No information about the site         
Wrong material selection         
Pressure to start execution         
Pressure to finalize works         
Commencement of constr. before design completed         
Inadequate interface management between contractors and 
consultants 
        
Discrepancies between the adm. and the man. team         
Poor supervision         
Lack of adherence of quality control         
Lack of construction knowledge         
Organization         
Lack of communication         
Lack of design audits         
Lack of knowledge management         
Inadequate skills and knowledge         
Lack of planning and resources         
Inadequate coordination with other projects         
Lack of staff supervision         
Ineffective implementation of QA         
Inadequate training         
People         
Stress (due to work overload)         
Slips         
Lack of experience and expertise         
Omission of checks         
Wrong distribution of information         
Misinterpretation due to lack of knowledge         
Table 2. Factors influencing rework  
 
Client changes and rework in each sub-project contributed to cost increases, though it 
was difficult to determine these amounts in sub-project 1 and 2. Noteworthy, with the 
exception of project 3, no significant schedule overruns were experienced. In sub-
project 3, the commencement of construction was delayed for 9 months due to 
contractual negotiations. Project 5 experienced a significant amount of non-
conformances, which led to rework and an extension of time. In an effort to meet the 
project’s scheduled completion date, additional resources were employed and tasks 
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were carried out concurrently, which lead to the opposite of the desired effect, as a 
significant delay occurred. This scenario is commonly referred to as Brookes Law. By 
pushing beyond the limits of acceptable levels of concurrency, complexity increases and 
destabilises the project. This further increases the time to complete tasks, particularly 
when revisions, repairs and rework occur. In this instance a rework cycle may 
commence (Cooper 1981). 
As noted in Table 2, sub-project 6 was delayed by four months, of which two months 
were attributable to extensions for scope changes. In sub-project 7 however no time 
extension was given for the rework that arose. Rework accounted for 16.5% of the 
project’s total cost overrun.  This data is significantly lower than that the reported 50% 
of a total project’s cost overrun found in a sample of 161 construction projects (Love 
2002). 
 
Project 1: Extension of the structure  
 
Within this sub-project incorrect information about existing site conditions were 
provided to the design consultants, which subsequently led to errors within the contract 
documentation. The execution of a transition slab in the bracket of the existing bridges 
structures was wrongly performed, which was not identified until the project was almost 
complete.  As result, a dispute between the client and the contractor was initiated.  
According to the Art 213 Ley 30/2007 de Contratos del Sector Público (Jefatura de 
Estado 2007) (law of public sector contracts), the contractor must follow the project 
documentation, the Project Manager instructions and/or the administration instructions 
during the construction process and the warranty period. In this particular instance, after 
commissioning the contractor would not accept responsibility for repairing the 
irregularities that were identified.  The contractor argued the client’s project 
management team did not find any quality deviations while the transition slab was being 
installed. If the quality deviation had been identified, then the contractor would have 
rectified it immediately.  The client denounced the contractor for not satisfying the 
conditions of the period of warranty and for the responsibility of hidden defects. This 
situation could have been avoided if supervisions and inspections had been regularly 
undertaken by the client’s project management team.  It would appear 
miscommunication and poor coordination between both parties contributed to the issue 
at hand. 
 
Project 2: Extension of the structure  
 
In project 2, incomplete contract documentation and lack of detailed analysis of the 
existing services and soil conditions were fundamentally the factors contributing to 
rework in this sub-project as: 
- no provision had been made within the contract documentation for micro piles to 
be included in the. Fundamentally, an omission error was made; and 
- no risk analysis was carried out, so during the execution of the foundations for the 
new pillars of the structure, instead of shoes, micro piles were executed to assure 
the new structure to the existing masonry. The contractor advised the client of this 
improvement to avoid undermines due to potential floods. 
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Project 3: Masonry extension (Viaduct of Francolí) 
 
The main structure of AP-7 is an eight hundred metre viaduct which passes over N-2 
road and Francolí River. The viaduct is composed of two bridges, which were both 
widened. New structural elements had to be built and therefore additional piling was 
required. As noted in Table 2, there were several organizational and project related 
factors that contributed to rework.  From a project perspective the main contributing 
factors were: 
- client changes or scope extension: Additional works were necessary to the 
embankments existing structure, which was adjacent to a main highway (N-
240). This highway experiences high levels traffic flow, which were interrupted 
during the additional works to piling required.  In addition, modifications to a 
load-retaining wall (including drainage) were necessary as a result of the new 
embankment.  A new design was necessary to include these modifications; 
- incomplete contract documentation (omission errors): No specifications about 
how to  join the new framework to the original one, and the unknown technique 
to adapt the union elements between the new and old structure provoked 
additional activities; and 
- incomplete analysis of the existing services and soil before the execution: The 
diversion of some services was not considered in the original design of the 
project. Thus, additional work which required the localization of services was 
required (oxygen and nitrogen pipes, oil pipelines and telecommunications). 
 
The main organizational factors were identified as to contributing to the incidence of 
rework were: 
 
- organizational re-use: In this instance, the execution or management acquired 
from previous projects was applied to this project which had negative 
consequences.  For example, pavement joints should have been executed when 
the tread layer in both sides was being undertaken simultaneously;  
- procedural violations: Tasks of clearing vegetation, illegal waste cleaning after 
the adjudication and demolition of a concrete pipe that affected the excavation; 
- power struggles between the administration and the management team: Critical 
decisions were affected by the quest for management control.  For example, the 
client unilaterally chose to pave the driveway instead of repairing the road board 
first, due to political pressures to ensure the highway could be used by the Easter 
holidays. This decision was not shared by the client’s project management team, 
although contractor had been instructed by the client directly to commence work 
without informing the project management team; and 
- lack of resolution solving incidents: The management team was asked to solve 
many incidences regarding the construction techniques which are normally 
solved by the contractor without consultations. As a result, the management 
team was overwhelmed, although it also showed a lack of knowledge in that 
field, leaving an unreliable image in management. 
 
Project 4: Masonry remodelling  
 
In this sub-project incomplete contract documentation was again found to be a 
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significant problem.  The contract documentation contained numerous design errors 
which had to be rectified during construction.  Normally, to avoid misunderstandings 
and ensure the project documentation is correct, services position is checked before 
starting the works. However, due to time constrains, these checks were not carried out. 
The lack of knowledge about the exact position of electrical and telecommunication 
services provoked its breakage during the safety fencing works. Other works like the 
replacement of the pavement in old pillars not included in the project had to be 
considered while the construction was going on. In addition, activities linked to 
signalling, marking and site protection also contributed to the cost overrun being 
experienced. 
 
Lack of inspection and supervision was also pervasive problem within this project. A 
new management company was chosen to deliver the construction works due to 
disagreements between client and previous managers.  Nevertheless, inexperienced 
engineers were dealing with the majority of the construction issues. Lack of 
organisational skills and leadership were latent during this period. Decisions were often 
taken correctly; however, disconnection existed between management and contractor. 
Circumstances were complicated when situations such as dealing with traffic operations 
during the construction process appeared as new issues for the new members of the 
management team, who did not have experience before on it. 
 
 
Project 5: Extension of the platform 
 
From a project perspective the causes of rework in this project were attributable to 
client changes, incomplete project information and workmanship errors:  
- Clients demands were mainly toll stations, not included in the initial project; 
complementary works such as car park, or control buildings; cameras movements; 
collection and replacement of toll traffic lights; collocation of provisional speed 
radars and emergency stop signals; collection of the signalling of the rest area; 
safety end user reinforcement during high traffic.  
- Other additional activities such exit lanes, signalling road signs, mounting and 
dismounting of a provisional third lane for weekends, and maintenance tasks 
during the drainage (cleaning of pipes and wells) were attributed to scope 
increase. 
- Incomplete information within contract documentation such as emergency stop 
zones; adaptation of the central reservation including passes between 2 and 3 km 
to comply the regulation; new signalling board: transportation and collocation of 
the existing signalling supports to the final position; safety tasks not described in 
the project; extension of the platform width; new drainage elements such as 
drainpipes and register wells, adversely influenced the project’s critical path 
especially when requests for information were not forthcoming from the design 
consultants. 
- Incomplete analysis of the existing services and the type of soil before the 
execution such soil tests to verify its typology was a non-considered cost, but it 
had an important effect in construction; derivation of existing services which cost 
money and time dealing with private services companies, and footing changes, it 
actually make the constructor to bring new machinery. Furthermore, the 
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movement of existing communication pipes and SOS supports were not expected 
by project managers. Also, the soil tests were not as expected so the inadequate 
material was replaced with selected material. 
- A misunderstood in laws about speed analysis of the end users was a controversial 
issue. It was not included in the project and this provoked exterior extension 
(signalling, markers, site protection, etc.) due to visibility problems.  
- Unexpected activities such as the demolition of an unexpected flagstone or 
unexpected lined ditches. 
 
Regarding the organizational factors contributing to rework were: 
- the wrong execution or management of previous projects that were latent in the 
overruns. Some examples are noted: ramps wrongly executed in Project 5 that had 
to be modified; adaptation of the lines of painting lanes for the high traffic during 
Eastern (this stretch was supposed to be finished by that time); finishing of the 
masonry of the previous project; coexistence of different activities from different 
projects (rigid barriers had to be continuously moved depending on the activities 
that were carried out); arcades were not executed when planned forced to modify 
the drainage; reinforcement of the protection of the arcades; reinforcement of the 
signalling. All these problems came originally from a lack of management, 
although the new idea of packaging the project and to build it up in separated 
parts by different contractors caused these subsequent problems. 
- substitution of the management team. Clearly, any change during the construction 
process impacts in the final result. The substitution of the project management 
team by another consulting company due to different points of view with the 
administration was in the most critical moment. The required time for the new 
management team to adapt to the project provoked the majority of the problems 
such as not detecting errors and defects until other activities had been started.  
These problems affected the inspection, supervision and quality control, 
provoking lack of coordination between the parties. 
- unexpected problems. In this particular project, a great number of unexpected 
issues appeared: the rain provoked a humidity excess of the central reservation 
material that had to be reinforced with lime; a ditch construction to address the 
exceed water to the river; the rain delayed foundation concreting; an accident 
forced to include stricter safety systems; the high number of heavy traffic that are 
driving through the old ditch converted into lane during the construction of the 
new lanes, provoked defects in the pavement and a debilitation of the fibre optic 
cables; the existing drainage of the central was insufficient and manholes had to 
be replaced with new drainage; the high quantity of vegetal soil forces to prepare 
places for the material stocks. 
 
 
Project 6: Platform extension in stretch 1 
 
Like Project 5, this project included the major part of the extension of the AP-7 third 
lane extension. Project 5 and Project 6 belong to the main project, which was divided in 
two parts, so they come from the same idea in terms of construction, although they are 
not developed by the same contractor. 
The most featured reworks in this project were basically three:  
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 Client changes or scope extension. Particularly, toll stations were not included in 
the initial project although the client demanded to cover this overrun as part of 
the project spending. Shelters and prefabricated elements were not part of the 
project due to be part of the tolls. 
 Incomplete documentation. In prior projects the importance of the uncompleted 
documentation and design errors on the project was explained. Specifically in 
this project, the second featured rework was due to the platform extension to 
improve the visibility while driving. 
 Management problems such as wrong execution or management of previous 
projects as modifications of the lane pavement due to wrong execution work. 
Moreover, the management problems were similar to Project 5 because it was 
being constructed when a new management team was announced. However, 
discrepancies between production manager and construction manager existed. 
Production manager did not solve some incidents during the process, while 
construction manager could not identify them on time due to the lack of staff. 
Not enough quality control drove that situation in an endless list of reworks after 
all. 
 
Project 7: Paving surface and horizontal signalling 
 
Technical and organisational problems together with other unexpected problems were 
the major causes of rework.  
- Unexpected problems: The high number of heavy traffic that were driving through 
the old ditch converted into lane during the construction of the new lanes, 
provoked defects in the pavement and a debilitation of the fibre optic cables and 
drainage pipes; the use of N-240 as a vehicle access to the site during the 
execution of the works (more than 5 months) deteriorated the pavement and had 
to be repaired.  
- Scope extension during the execution of the pavement to improve superficial 
drainage and a correct subterraneous water evacuation.  
- Errors in project documentation. The execution procedures of the banking had to 
be redesigned as the design was impossible to carry out, which would have caused 
important problems in drainage and stability in cars’ driving.  
 
 
Project 8: Adaptation of the vehicles containment system 
 
In project 8, inaccurate project documentation and the lack of knowledge of the 
management staff were fundamentally the factor contributing to rework. The 
management team drew up a new project because the initial one was untreatable. The 
project modifications provoked no time enough to supervisions and inspections and 
inappropriate quality control. Other incidences like misunderstandings with the 
contractor or lack of communication were usual. 
Moreover, like in the other sub projects, incomplete project documentation such as extra 
safety conditions or enlargement of car protections in case of impact provoked rework 
activities.  
Similarly, the incomplete analysis of the existing services and soil before the execution 
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were also a factor contributing to rework. Affected services such as telephony below the 
containment system in a different position from the project provoked the modification 
of the collocation of the support of barriers;  
 
 
3.  DYNAMICS OF REWORK 
 
The analysis revealed that no single factor could be used to pinpoint a cause that 
contributed to rework.  As a result, a generic causal model that demonstrates the 
interdependency exists. Factors are presented and discussed below.  Taking into account 
the factors identified in Table 2, direct observations, interviews with all the parties and 
documentary sources of the 8 subprojects the influence diagram of rework for each 
subproject was developed. This information was integrated and implemented in a 
generic influence diagram of rework and presented in Figure 2. The arrows that link 
each variable indicate a place where a cause and effect relationship exists, while the 
plus or minus sign at the head of each arrow indicates the direction of causality between 
the variables. 
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Figure 2.Generic influence diagram of rework 
 
Unexpected situations such as inconsistencies between scope, budget and schedule, 
unanticipated problems or changes often provoke a series of dynamics that can provoke 
rework and thus create substantial cost and schedule overrun. For example, design 
changes during construction increased scope and therefore the work to be undertaken. In 
the case of highway projects rework impact on traffic flow and as a result additional 
safety are required.  
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A lack of understanding and knowledge of client requirements hindered scope 
development, increased workload which subsequently subjected consultants to schedule 
pressure. As a result, design errors and omissions arose in the contract documentation. 
This was mainly because design audits, reviews and verifications where not adequately 
undertaken (Love et al. 2010a). Such errors and omissions were not identified until 
construction was being undertaken. The time to rectify the error can affect the progress 
of the work or even require a design change and thus lead to cost increase and time 
overruns. The later design errors are identified in the project cycle the more costly they 
are likely to rectify, especially once construction has commenced.  
 
Scope uncertainty is an innate feature in highway construction. In the case study 
presented, it arose primarily due to client inexperience dealing in multiple simultaneous 
contracts. Highway projects in Spain have tended to be procured using the traditional 
lump sum method.  The requirement of contractor involvement during the design 
process can improve constructability and reduce the probability of design changes. 
When there is scope uncertainty and no contractor involvement during design then the 
likelihood of design changes increases, which may increase project costs and time and 
lead to claims and disputes (Love et al. 2012b). 
 
Similarly, productivity is affected by work quality, availability of prerequisites, out-of-
sequence work, schedule pressure, morale, skill and experience, organizational size 
changes and overtime (Lyneis and Cooper 2001). In the same way, stakeholders’ 
relationship and differences between design team and contractors can make planning 
difficult, as they may have differing goals and objectives. In this case study the 
consultants had not worked with the contractor before and there was a great deal of 
tension and reluctance for parties to work together. The contractor perceived that the 
lack of knowledge and poor contract documentation produced by the designers inhibited 
the development of teamwork and joint problem solving. As the project progressed and 
design errors became increasingly prevalent, the more time the contractor spent trying 
to solve the problems that arose on site. 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
Although little systematic knowledge is available on the dynamics of rework in 
construction projects, generic systemic models of rework have been developed for 
residential apartments (Love and Mandal 1999 and Love et al. 2008) and for complex 
hydrocarbon (oil and gas) projects (Love et al. 2011). 
 
Both studies related to building construction projects (Love and Mandal 1999 and Love 
et al. 2008) revealed that most of the rework experienced was generated from the 
conception and design stages of the projects. Mainly poor quality of the documentation 
and design errors provoked changes to be implemented during construction.  
 
Although no generic systemic model of rework has been developed for civil 
infrastructures, the analysis of 115 civil infrastructure projects revealed that the 
ineffective use of IT by design team members was the primary factor contributing to 
rework in this kind of projects (Love et al. 2010b). This finding is in line with those 
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obtained in construction engineering projects and also with the results of this study and 
means that the design stage is the most important one to reduce rework.  
 
In the case study presented, akin to Love and Mandal (1999) it was found that poor skill 
levels of the management team provoked a lack of resolution solving problems. In the 
same way, the lack of attention to coordinating and integrating the existing services 
with the drawings was found to contribute to rework.  Design reviews and verifications 
and selection of appropriate firms on the actual skill level and experience of those staff 
that are actually going to manage the project’s design process are some suggestions to 
minimize errors and thus rework. 
 
Akin to building construction projects and the results of this study, the factors of poorly 
defined scope, unrealistic schedules, design changes, and coordination problems were 
identified as contributors to rework in complex hydrocarbon (oil and gas) projects 
(Love et al 2011). However, in complex hydrocarbon projects rework was expected and 
considered a norm. The issue at hand therefore related to ‘when and where’ rework 
would materialize, because it was considered that the implementation of front end 
loading, audits, and reviews would capture any design flaws that may have materialized. 
The potential revenue that could be generated from earlier extraction and production of 
oil and gas outweighed any rework costs that were likely to be incurred (Love et al 
2011). This is not the case of public infrastructures such as highways.  
 
The major difference regarding rework between highway infrastructures and other civil 
engineering works identified in this case study was the need to deal with surrounding 
aspects such as traffic operations during the construction process providing provisional 
lanes for the traffic or dealing with accidents when they occurred.  
 
On the other hand, the particularity that each subproject was competitively awarded 
under a separate works contract provoked misunderstandings between the parties 
involved and therefore the majority of the organisational problems. 
 
Finally, the degree of uncertainty that prevails within transportation infrastructure 
projects was also a particularity of highway infrastructures together with ambiguous and 
poor project documentation and changes made at the request of the client where also 
found to be determinants to contribute to rework. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In Spain there is limited systematic knowledge available about the dynamics of rework 
in highway projects, despite the fact that they frequently exceed budget and schedule by 
more than 10%.  A major factor contributing to cost and schedule overruns is rework.  
In this paper, the factors contributing to rework on a major highway project were 
identified and used to produce a generic systemic model that illustrates the relationships 
between variables.   
 
Through observation and subsequent analyse of interviews and documentation a high 
degree of interdependency existed between perceived causes. This resulted in the 
 18 
 
nomenclature of Project, Organization and People to be adopted and used to develop he 
rework generic systemic model.   
 
The research findings are akin to so similar studies and therefore confirm the reality of 
the rework phenomena in projects.  Notably the risk of scope changes, high complexity, 
poor skill levels and unexpected underground services were systematically 
underestimated during the design and planning process to produce and therefore an 
unrealistic forecast of project costs and schedule was made.  
 
Understanding how variables interact with one another and the variables that contribute 
to rework provides a new view to be acquired that can lead to behaviour adjustment. 
This may be achieved by formally recognizing rework as a key performance indicator 
within public infrastructure contracts and linking it to a risk/reward model of 
compensation. It is suggested that this would stimulate learning and process 
improvements for future highway projects. 
 
Project managers are often confronted with having to make decisions based on an 
imperfect and incomplete knowledge of future events. This is particularly the case 
contract documentation is incomplete and contains errors.  One approach to improving 
managerial decision-making is to quantify uncertainties using probability.   
 
Future research should focus on developing probabilities and impacts of risk that arise 
from the contract documentation process of a project, particularly the interaction 
between risks.  The use of probabilistic network models, such Bayesian networks are a 
suitable tool for measuring and managing rework in projects due to their ability to take 
into causal relations.   
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